Analysis: Kazakh investment in Georgia's energy sector
by John C.K. Daly
As oil and natural gas production has risen steadily in the former republics of the Soviet Union, a striking division
has emerged between the have and have-not states. For the deprived newly independent nations of the Caucasus and
Central Asia, their history since 1991 has been steadily rising energy prices as their hydrocarbon-rich neighbours
attempt to raise fees to world-market rates.
The one glimmer of hope for the hydrocarbon-deprived states of the Caucasus and Central Asia is to position themselves as transit nations, collecting revenue for pipelines crisscrossing their territory.
A key country in this category is Georgia, which eventually came to host two pipelines for transporting Caspian crude
westward. The country's utility and apparent stability caught the eye of petrodollar-rich Kazakh investors, who went
on a spending spree.
The five-day conflict last August between Georgia and Russia highlighted the strategic fragility of the country as a transit corridor, and that geostrategic reality along with the global recession has left Kazakh investors in a skein of lawsuits as they try to unload their endangered properties.
In May 2006, KazTransGaz, a subsidiary of Kazakhstan's state energy company KazMunaiGaz (KMG), purchased the Georgian
capital Tbilisi's TbilGaz gas distribution company for the bargain price of $ 12.5 mm, establishing
KazTransGaz-Tbilisi to oversee operations. In a development that in hindsight might have given the new owners pause,
KazTransGaz was the only bidder in the tender, which required the winner not only to maintain the company's profile
but reconstruct the ramshackle Soviet-era system and retain all employees.
Seeking to further Kazakhstan's influence along its hydrocarbon export routes and diversify its options away from the Russian-dominated Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline to Novorossiysk, in 2005 KMG began to build a tanker fleet for the Caspian as well as acquire useful real estate.
KMG, along with Western energy firms, pumped $ 5 bn into developing Georgia's Batumi, Poti and Kulevi Black Sea ports
over the last decade and in February 2008 KMG bought Georgia's Batumi Oil Terminal from Greenoak Holdings and French
bank BNP Paribas. Greenoak had already invested more than $ 200 mm in the terminal, which has a capacity to export 15
mm tpy of crude oil and products and two years earlier had paid $ 92 mm for a 49-year lease to manage the port.
The deal gave KMG, through its subsidiary KazTransOil, direct access to the open sea, a most useful development in light of Kazakhstan's ambitions to increase crude oil production to 2.6 mm bpd by 2015.
The champagne celebrations in Astana did not last long. Six months later, as the conflict intensified, on Aug. 10,
Rovnag Abdullayev, head of the State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, said that because of the fighting, Batumi port
authorities suspended the facility's seaborne 200,000 bpd shipments, which are supplied by rail.
The five-day conflict last August betweenRussia and Georgia highlighted the latter's strategic fragility as a transit corridor. With Batumi closed, Kazakhstan was unable to use Georgia's two transit pipelines. The $ 600 mm, 515-mile Baku-Supsa 100,000-bpd pipeline, essentially a refurbished Soviet-era pipeline, opened in April 1999. The $ 3.6 bn, 1,092-mile, 1 mm-bpd Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which began operations in May 2006, was the final element in Azerbaijan's drive for independence from the Kremlin over its energy exports. Both were closed by their operating companies over concerns about the fighting.
The clash's effects extended to the Caspian itself. The day after Abdullayev spoke, Kazakh Prime Minister Karim
Massimov directed KMG officials to divert the country's maritime oil exports bound for Baku, Azerbaijan, to internal
consumers until the dimensions of the conflict became clearer.
KMG President Serik Burkitbayev told, "In line with an order issued by the military administration, we took out of the port all our dry cargo vessels and tankers, which have been filled with oil. By this morning we filled up an oil tanker, but right now, all tankers have been taken out and we are sending oil to storage." The decision was hardly minor, as Burkitbayev said the port now handles nearly a million tons of crude oil a year.
Following the cessation of hostilities, BOT resumed exports, but if Kazakhstan is stuck with that particular
investment, it is now seeking to divest itself of TbilGaz. Since its 2006 purchase, KazTransGaz-Tbilisi invested more
than $ 100 mm in the refurbishment and upgrading of Tbilisi's gas supply system, causing the system's natural gas
losses to fall from 60 % to 20 %.
Despite the increase in efficiency, KazTransGaz-Tbilisi's losses rose, and the company was driven into debt after SOCAR, its gas supplier, sharply raised prices. Now, KazTransGaz-Tbilisi's parent company KMG is considering selling TbilGaz if it can recoup its investment.
On March 23, KMG President Kairgeldy Kabyldin complained, "If SOCAR wants to help Georgia, why is it selling gas to
Georgia at a horrendously high price? SOCAR sells gas to Russia and Ukraine at $ 280 per tcm, yet offers it to
Georgia at $ 400 per tcm. This is ridiculous, completely out of touch with reality."
The Georgian government moved quickly to block the Kazakh disinvestment. On March 16, the Georgian National Electricity Regulatory Commission appointed a "special administrator" to temporarily take over management of KazTransGaz-Tbilisi and act as a general director until the Georgian government determines whether KMG is in breach of contract and how the company will discharge its outstanding $ 40 mm debt.
A week after the Regulatory Commission's action, Kabyldin said, "We are ready to sell TbilGaz if our investment contributions, debt financing as well as the financial support are compensated."
Tbilisi's actions will be closely watched by the international investment community and energy companies, already
leery of further investment in Georgia in the wake of its ill-advised military misadventure with Russia. For
energy-poor Georgia to treat rising petro-state Kazakhstan as a potential fiscal scofflaw over KazTransGaz-Tbilisi's
debts may eventually enrich Tbilisi's treasury by $ 40 mm, but the final cost may be far higher as energy-rich former
Soviet states decide to invest their surpluses elsewhere.
Given that Georgia's relations with energy giant Russia remain strained, it seems wishful thinking on the part of the Georgian government that such actions will not give foreign investors even more pause before investing there.