Russia's energy drive leaves US reeling
by M.K. Bhadrakumar
The gloves finally came off the Dmitry Medvedev presidency in Russia. It had to happen sooner or later, but few would
have expected this soon.
It was crystal clear US President George W. Bush administered a diplomatic snub to Medvedev on the sidelines of the
Group of Eight (G8) summit meeting at Hokkaido, Japan. Bush characterized him patronizingly as a "sharp guy" soon
after they met in Hokkaido on July 9, but that was after making sure Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proceeded to
Prague and signed a deal just the previous day to install a US radar system as part of its missile defence system in
Central Europe.
If Medvedev's core mission in Hokkaido was to underscore Russia's growing role in the world arena as a power with
which the West has to contend, Bush acted as if he couldn't care. The US was also plainly dismissive of Medvedev's
proposal at the G8 for a pan-European security system that would include Russia.
Medvedev expressed his "dismay" on hearing about the Prague deal. As if to rub in the snub, Rice proceeded from
Prague to Bulgaria, where the US has for the first time established a military base, and then on to Georgia to
discuss its plans of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
While in Tbilisi, she called for international mediation to stop violence spilling over in Georgia's breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abhkazia, which have been sources of rising tensions, with Georgia accusing Russia of
trying to annex the regions. To carry matters further, the US began a joint military exercise with Georgia codenamed
Immediate Response 2008, near Tbilisi, which will continue through the month of July.
The exercise, financed by the Pentagon and planned by the US Armed Forces Eastern Command, is intended as a warning
to Russia that Georgia is America's project and Washington wouldn't hesitate to do some heavy lifting to safeguard
the "Rose Revolution".
On the face of it, such hubris is illogical and unnecessary since the West should have every reason not to embarrass
Medvedev. The West has been propagating in recent months that the youthful Russian president is a potential
independent decision-maker in the Kremlin with whom it could do business -- unlike his predecessor, Vladimir
Putin.
Reflecting US thinking, Carnegie Moscow Centre scholar Dmitri Trenin wrote recently that the West noted "Medvedev's
quick-wittedness, his calm style of conducting talks, and his clear desire to show that he is the one who is the real
master of Russian diplomacy... There are much greater grounds for expecting that Dmitry Medvedev... will slowly but
steadily concentrate powers in his own hands."
Clearly, what has been going on for the past few months on the East-West stage is one of those pantomimes that the
West and Russia are equally adept at playing. But the US seems to have concluded that all the Western flattery about
him hasn't really gone to Medvedev's head and he has merely been demonstrating his own skill in dramatics.
Actually, nothing much has changed in Russia. The polls show Putin, now premier, is still seen by Russians as their
"supreme leader", with a popularity rating coasting above 70 % -- with Medvedev stuck at 47 % -- and the truth might
be somewhere near what a Moscow commentator recently sized up, namely, that Medvedev is a co-pilot in the cockpit in
which Putin remains the captain.
Besides, Medvedev would know that even if he wished to be the European modernizer and G8 club member that the West
wanted him to be, he would find himself hopelessly at odds with his country. According to a poll by a Russian
television network, the symbol of renewal of present-day Russia turns out to be none other than Josef Stalin. By a
substantial margin, Stalin left behind two colourful Vladimirs -- the singer Vladimir Vysotsky and the revolutionary
Vladimir Lenin -- and a host of other perennial Russian heroes like Ivan the Terrible and Alexander Pushkin.
Indeed, when Medvedev signed a new foreign policy strategy for Russia, it cameto light that for the first time the
prime minister has been put in the driving seat to implement foreign policy measures -- hitherto a presidential
prerogative -- which also shows that the Kremlin will pursue the line set by Putin in his eight-year presidency. The
vague and somewhat incomprehensible expectations that there might be of some kind of "liberalization" in Medvedev's
foreign policy have proved to be unfounded.
But Moscow hasn't taken lightly the US snub. In an address to Russian envoys in Moscow, Medvedev unambiguously stated
his intention to continue Putin's foreign policy course, criticizing the US moves on missile defence deployment, the
West's failure to ratify the revised Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Kosovo's independence, etc.
He said, "We strongly affirm that the deployment of elements of the global missile defence in Eastern Europe only
exacerbates the situation... we will be forced to respond to it in kind... This is linked to Russian-American
agreements on strategic stability. Obviously, this common heritage will not be able to survive if one party is
permitted to selectively destroy individual elements of this strategic regime. We cannot agree to that."
According to the noted German expert on Russia, Alexander Rahr, the Russian veto on the United Nations Security
Council draft resolution on Zimbabwe was also a response to the US move on missile defence.
"China's opposition is easy to understand as it has many economic interests in Zimbabwe. Russia has none. Russia's
veto is a response to the missile shield, to Abkhazia and to many other things... Russia is trying to show that
America cannot decide everything," Rahr said.
The Russian veto generated a new American theme song that Medvedev isn't calling the shots in the Kremlin and might
have got slapped down on Zimbabwe. But Moscow brushed aside the suggestion.
The Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling the draft resolution on Zimbabwe "a dangerous precedent...
illegitimate and dangerous, leading towards unbalancing the whole UN system". The statement rebuked Washington and
London, saying, "Russia took into account the fact that the situation in Zimbabwe does not pose a threat to regional,
let alone international peace and security and does not warrant adoption of sanctions against that country."
Again, Moscow announced that for the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian warships were
resuming patrol of the Arctic waters. In effect, Medvedev signalled he was maintaining the course of expanded
military patrols begun by Putin. Why such a sudden quickening of the tempo in US-Russian relations?
The answer might be found on an entirely different plane -- energy security.
What emerges is that if anything, Medvedev is pursuing Russia's energy diplomacy more robustly than Putin. Soon after
taking over in the Kremlin in May, Medvedev ordered the expeditious completion of the first stage of the Eastern
Siberia Pacific Oil Pipeline (ESPO) by end-2009. The ESPO has a vital role in Moscow's efforts to balance its oil
export strategy between Europe and Asia-Pacific. Moscow hopes to target Asia-Pacific as the export destination for
one-third of its oil exports by 2020, as compared to 3 % currently.
In early July, Medvedev undertook a diplomatic tour of the Caspian region, covering Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan. In Azerbaijan's capital Baku, he made a stunning offer that Russia was prepared to buy Azerbaijan's
entire gas output at market prices. In Ashgabat, he shored up Turkmenistan's commitment to the modernization of the
Central Asia-Centre Pipeline and the construction of a new littoral Caspian pipeline.
Medvedev succeeded in prevailing over competing European and US rivals in the struggle for Turkmen gas. He further
ensured that oil and gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan will not bypass Russia. But what has truly incensed the
Bush administration are Gazprom's dramatic inroads into Africa.
Russian giant Gazprom, the largest extractor of natural gas in the world, has announced plans to build a pipeline
across the Mediterranean to pump Libyan gas to Europe. This is the final lap of a Kremlin strategy that involves
Gazprom handling the entire output of Libya's gas, oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) designated for export to
Europe and the US.
Look at Gazprom's terse announcement in Moscow on July 9, "The Libyan side positively evaluated Gazprom's proposal to
buy all future volumes of gas, oil and liquefied natural gas assigned for export at competitive prices."
Now, Washington gingerly allowed the re-entry into the "international community" by Muammar Gaddafi, Brotherly Leader
and Guide of the Revolution in Libya, on the basis of clear understanding. Western statesmen from British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown to French President Nikolas Sarkozy and former Italian premier Romano Prodi queued up to climb
the window of business opportunity opened by the Bush administration. And then Putin visits Tripoli in April, less
than a month before he left office, and the two erstwhile colonels decided to jointly handle all of Libya's energy
resources.
And Gazprom seeks to buy exploration licenses in Nigeria and proposes to build a pipeline from there to Algeria, and
with Algeria, Gazprom is developing a proposal on "joint" marketing of gas in Europe. US officials have gone
ballistic.
"The monopolistic Gazprom is behaving like a monopolist does. It tries to gain control of the market as much as
possible and to stifle competition. And that's clearly what is going on," thundered Matthew Bryza, US deputy
assistant secretary of state for Eurasian affairs. "The Kremlin wants Gazprom to be a dominant force in global
energy, and the dominant force in global gas. Tying up gas resources in Central Asia and Africa is part of that," he
added. The plan is for Gazprom to dominate "in every corner of the planet", he alleged.
Bryza's outburst is understandable. The good work he did lies now in ruins. Washington was relieved to see the back
of Putin's presidency, butit now transpires that Gazprom may have only stepped up the pace of overtures under
Medvedev's astute guidance.
Besides, with its new assets in Africa, Gazprom will soon be knocking for access to the US market through supplies of
LNG. The European and international companies which have been traditionally present in the African market will be
compelled to play a role alongside Gazprom.
Washington hit back by ensuring that Russian companies are left out in the cold from the 30 contracts for lucrative
oil deals that Baghdad is awarding. It is a big blow for Russia. In February, Moscow had written off $ 12 bn or 93 %
of Iraq's debt to Russia in a move that was widely seen as aimed to help Russian oil company LUKoil regain the Saddam
Hussein-era rights to develop Iraq's giant West Qurna-2 oil field. But under US pressure, the Iraqi government is now
awarding West Qurna-2 to the US's Chevron.
The Kremlin didn't show any anger, but coincidence or not, Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller suddenly arrivedin
Tehran and discussed with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad the setting up of an organization of gas-producing
countries. No doubt, with the Russian foothold in Libya (which has estimated natural gas reserves of 1.47 tcm), in
coordination with Algeria (which currently supplies over 10 % of Europe's gas supplies), Qatar (with proven natural
gas reserves of 25.8 tcm) and Iran (which has the world's second-largest reserves after Russia), the time for a "Gas
OPEC" is approaching.
The Iranian leader also suggested to Miller a market-sharing arrangement so that Russia and Iran could "collectively
meet the demands of Europe, India and China in the gas sector". During the visit, an agreement was signed on the
development of Iran's oil and gas fields by Russian companies; on Russian participation in the transfer of Iran's
Caspian Sea crude oil to the Oman Sea; cooperation in the development of Iran's fabulous North Azadegan oil field;
and, possible participation of Gazprom in the planned Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project.
Evidently, Moscow took a deliberate decision to press ahead with Iran in energy cooperation in the full glare of
world publicity in complete disregard of US displeasure. Tehran loved it.
To quote a US expert, "Russia's strategic interest in Iran implicitly underscores the futility of hopes that Moscow
would cooperate with Washington in imposing meaningful sanctions on Iran."
"While Western European companies are moving out of Iran or suspending agreements for fear of US sanctions (which
penalize investments of more than $ 20 mm a year in Iran's oil and gas sector), Gazprom is enlarging the already
existing foothold."
Conceivably, the danger of losing out on the last energy frontier to Russia (and China) could be a factor in
Washington's policy shift on Iran talks. Washington calls the u-turn "a strong signal to the Iranian government that
the United States is committed to diplomacy". But according to The New York Times, Rice has decided to "test Iran's
willingness to consider an international package of incentives meant to coax Iran into making concessions on its
nuclear program".
What we do not know is how close the Bush administration may be for involvement in Iran's energy sector, which is an
element in the so-called "international package of incentives". (Halliburton, which Vice President Dick Cheney
headed, was a very active player in Iran.)
By now it must be obvious to the Bush administration that the youthful-looking, post-communist lawyer-president who
took over from Putin has lost no time drilling a hole through the entire US strategy to weaken Gazprom's grip over
the supply of gas to Europe.
The sense of fury is imaginable. But then Washington has only itself to blame.
Medvedev's career as an energy czar is an open book like Cheney's -- or Rice's. From 2000, he headed Gazprom. Now he
controls Gazprom from the Kremlin. Few took note that when he formally bid farewell to the Gazprom board of directors
at a ceremony in Moscow on May 27, Medvedev took immense personal pride in pointing out that during his eight-year
stewardship, Gazprom's capitalization skyrocketed by a factor of 46, and one fifth of Russia's budget is today
derived from Gazprom's activities.
He concluded, "I want to say in my turn that we will have the chance to see each other and discuss things in working
meetings. So, nothing is coming to an end. It's only the beginning."
In sum, the flow of events in places as far apart as Prague, Hokkaido, Tbilisi, Harare, Tehran and the Arctic
underscored that after a brief respite, the rivalries over energy security have revived with a ferocity that can rock
the equilibrium of overall US-Russia relations. The situation will likely be exacerbated in the coming period. The
geopolitics of energy security are a highly sensitive subject for the Bush administration, whose profound links with
Big Oil are legion. It is a tremendous loss of face for the Bush-Cheney-Rice combine that Moscow is outwitting the US
on the energy front.
The strong possibility is that the Bush administration will press the pedal on multiple fronts on the Eurasian
geopolitical landscape and create a fait accompli of US-Russian mutual antagonism for Senator Barack Obama, should he
become president. The haste behind the Prague deal on missile defence smacks of such thinking.
Almost certainly, Rice will press for a decision on the plan of action in respect of Georgia's and Ukraine's
membership of NATO at the meeting of the alliance's foreign ministers in December.
The question, "Who is the boss in Russia?" doesn't really seem to matter anymore.
Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
